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Policy background
The NHS spends about £11bn (€15bn, $22bn) annu‑
ally on pharmaceuticals, of which £8bn is on branded 
drugs, representing about 13% and 10% respectively 
of available resources.1 As growth in NHS funding is 
expected to slow, access to innovative technologies will 
depend on savings found elsewhere. The UK Depart‑
ment of Health uses the pharmaceutical price regula‑
tion scheme to control expenditure on branded drugs. 
This 50 year old scheme is intended to control the prof‑
its companies can earn through periodic and general 
price cuts. A report by the Office of Fair Trading rec‑
ommended reform, basing a drug’s price on its health 
benefits.1 2 The government has confirmed its intention 
to renegotiate the existing scheme,3 and a recent House 
of Commons Health Committee report has also wel‑
comed reform.4 5 The policy debate about price, value, 
and innovation is at a critical stage for the NHS.
The principles of value based pricing
Establishing the value of a drug requires an assessment 
of whether the additional health expected to be gained 
from its use exceeds the health forgone as other NHS 
treatments are displaced by its additional cost—a com‑
parison of the incremental cost effectiveness ratio (ICER, 
the ratio of the additional health gained to the additional 
costs) with a threshold for cost effectiveness (see box 1). 
The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excel‑
lence (NICE) uses a threshold of £20 000 to £30 000 
per QALY, representing an estimate of the health for‑
gone based on the estimated productivity of other NHS 
activities.6 This range may be too high.7 8 Critically, this 
key determinant of value ought to be removed from the 
heat of political negotiation and become an empirical 
question subject to scientific analysis as recently recom‑
mended by the health select committee.4 5
Negotiating a price at which an ICER is just equal to 
the threshold ensures that the health benefits offered 
by the drug are just offset by the health displaced else‑
where in the NHS, so all the benefits of the innova‑
tion go to the manufacturer in the form of revenue 
(see box 1)—the net health benefits to the NHS are 
zero. If cheaper generics become available after the 
patent expires then the NHS may ultimately benefit. 
Cost effectiveness, however, will usually vary between 
subgroups of patients. Consequently, by offering a 
 manufacturer a menu of prices, each associated with 
complementary guidance on NHS use (higher prices 
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being permitted only when guidance restricts use to 
more cost effective subgroups), positive net health ben‑
efits can be achieved (see box 2). The NHS will share 
the benefits of innovation with the manufacturers, pro‑
viding incentives for the NHS to increase uptake.9
In the short run the principles of value based pricing 
mean that drugs will be approved for use only at prices 
that ensure that their expected health benefits exceed 
the health displaced. In the longer run, prices based on 
value to the NHS will provide incentives for manufac‑
turers to develop technologies that are more likely to 
be of value and cost effective. The responsibility of the 
NHS, through assessment authorities like NICE, is to 
signal clearly and reliably what is of value. It is then for 
manufacturers to choose to invest in the development 
of drugs that they believe will be both cost effective for 
the NHS and command prices and sales which provide 
a satisfactory return on investment.
Some concerns
Several concerns can be raised about the consequences of 
value based pricing for the pharmaceutical sector.10‑15
NHS drug spend
Value based pricing might lead to a lower NHS spend 
on drugs.12 It would certainly lead to a reallocation of 
revenue from less to more valuable technologies. This 
would mean a reduction in price for some drugs, like 
premium priced branded drugs when an equivalent 
generic is available. Lower prices for some drugs, how‑
ever, does not necessarily imply a reduction in the over‑
all NHS drugs spend, which might increase, particularly 
if new and valuable pharmaceuticals are developed that 
can command higher prices. 
Domestic research and development
Companies that have invested in research in the UK 
might regard value based pricing as the “last straw” 
and relocate if they fear a reduction in revenue.10 It is, 
however, a myth that the current pharmaceutical price 
regulation scheme incentivises inward investment. In 
fact the scheme legally cannot distinguish between 
companies with research located in the UK and those 
elsewhere.1 Choice of location is directly influenced by 
a range of incentives including investment in infrastruc‑
ture, the degree of public investment in research, and 
local costs. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which 
the local market would directly influence this choice 
Karl Claxton professor of 
economics,Centre for Health 
Economics, University of 
York, York and Department of 
Economics and Related Studies, 
University of York, York
Andrew Briggs Lindsay professor 
of economic evaluation and health 
policy, Public Health and Health 
Policy, University of Glasgow, 
Glasgow
Martin J Buxton professor 
of health economics, Health 
Economics Research Group, 
Brunel University, Middlesex
anthony J Culyer professor 
of economics, Department of 
Economics and Related Studies, 
University of York, York and 
Department of Health Policy, 
Management and Evaluation, 
University of Toronto, Toronto, 
Canada
Christopher McCabe professor 
of health economics, Institute of 
Health Sciences, University of 
Leeds, Leeds
Simon Walker research fellow, 
Centre for Health Economics, 
University of York, York
Mark J Sculpher professor of 
health economics, Centre for 
Health Economics, University of 
York, York
Correspondence to:  
M Sculpher mjs23@york.ac.uk
accepted: 18 November 2007
ANALYSIS
252	 	 	 BMJ | 2 feBruary 2008 | VoluMe 336
because products developed in one location can be pro‑
duced and marketed worldwide. The concern is more 
readily explicable as a threat: provide easy access to a 
subsidised domestic market or research will relocate.16 
Whether such threats are credible, and whether public 
policy should respond if they are, is for others to judge. 
Concern for inward investment is evidently legitimate. 
The question is whether it is appropriate to use NHS 
resources for industrial policy rather than the improve‑
ment of health, particularly when other more effective 
incentives and legal policy levers are available.
Incentives for “me too” products
There might also be concerns that drugs that are sec‑
ond or subsequent to market (“me too”) will be disad‑
vantaged.10 Value based pricing, however, means that 
their manufacturers could charge the same price as the 
incumbent (if they are equivalent) and have the same 
NICE guidance, or command a higher price if they can 
demonstrate additional health benefits. They will neces‑
sarily have a shorter period to generate revenue before 
generics become available but, if industry is hoping to 
continue to sell at premium prices when equivalent 
generics become available, then value based pricing, or 
any other policy to encourage appropriate prescribing, 
will undermine these expectations.
Value of innovation
The potential value of an innovative technology—that 
is, one that is likely to lead to the development of more 
valuable future technologies—may not be recognised.17 
In other markets private sector companies anticipate the 
benefits of innovation and the future market returns that 
flow from better products. What is different in health 
care is that neither consumers (patients) nor their agents 
(doctors) are well placed to identify and synthesise all 
relevant evidence and undertake the computation 
required to assess value fully. Even if such individual 
assessments were possible they are unlikely to lead to 
decisions consistent with the NHS’s collectively agreed 
objectives and resource constraints. Instead NICE has 
responsibility for assessing and signalling value on behalf 
of the whole NHS. So why should the NHS pay more 
than the value of the benefits from a new technology in 
the hope that a more valuable future technology will be 
developed? To do so is to pay twice for the innovation 
and to encourage inappropriate investments in innova‑
tions that are not worth while.9
Some critical issues
Although many of these concerns seem ill founded, 
there are dangers in a value based pricing scheme. 
A poorly specified system could reduce rather than 
improve health and undermine the evidence base for 
future NHS practice.
Cost effectiveness threshold and subgroups
The cost effectiveness threshold has a key role in value 
based pricing (box 1). Therefore, its assessment ought 
to be transparent and based on independent scientific 
analysis.4 Moreover, the NHS will share the benefits of 
innovation only if the assessment body has the power 
to demand that manufacturers analyse patients by sub‑
group or else has the resources and access to data to 
conduct the analysis itself (box 2). Manufacturers may 
try to offer “all or nothing deals” to get higher prices 
with an unrestricted NICE recommendation. Avoiding 
this requires explicit and transparent pricing rules and 
sufficient independence to say “no” to such offers.
Price and the need for evidence
Positive guidance on a new drug will have an impact 
on the prospects of acquiring further evidence to sup‑
port its use because the incentives for manufacturers 
to conduct evaluative research are removed and the 
clinical community may regard further experimental 
research as unethical. Price negotiation and guidance 
ought therefore to account for both the value of the 
technology and the value of the evidence that may be 
forgone for future NHS patients.9 18 19
Box 1 |  Value and the cost effectiveness threshold
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Fig 1 Value, price, and cost effectiveness
The concept of value and its relation to price, cost effectiveness, and the cost effectiveness 
threshold is illustrated in figure 1.
• At price P1 a new drug offers a gain of two units of health outcome, here expressed as quality 
adjusted life years (QALYs), at an additional cost to the NHS of £20 000—an incremental 
cost effectiveness ratio (ICER) of £10 000 per QALY gained. The key question is whether the 
expected gain of two QALYs is greater than the health outcomes forgone elsewhere as other 
NHS treatments are displaced by the additional cost. In figure 1 this is represented by a cost 
effectiveness threshold set at £20 000 per QALY—that is, every £20 000 found from existing 
resources displaces one QALY elsewhere in the NHS. At price P1 the technology is thus 
expected to improve health by two QALYs and displace only one QALY elsewhere. There is a net 
health benefit of one QALY to the NHS as a whole and the technology is cost effective (the ICER 
is less than the cost effectiveness threshold)
• If the price of the drug were P2 then the NHS would anticipate the same health gains of two 
QALYs but at a higher additional cost of £40 000—an ICER of £20 000 per QALY (which is the 
same as the threshold). These higher additional costs will now be expected to displace two 
QALYs. The gains in health (two QALYs) are just offset by the health forgone elsewhere (also 
two QALYs) and overall net health benefits to the NHS are zero
• At a higher price, such as P3, the costs increase to £60 000—an ICER of £30 000 per QALY. Now 
the health forgone (three QALYs) exceeds the health gained from the technology (two QALYs) 
and overall net health benefits are negative (minus one QALY). The technology is not cost 
effective at price P3 and does more harm than good in terms of the overall health of the nation.
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Additional evidence might be provided while a drug is 
approved for use in the NHS. However, this type of “risk 
sharing” will need to establish when additional evidence 
is needed, the type of evidence required, and whether 
it can be gathered while the technology is approved for 
use. For example, the type of observational registry data 
that are often envisaged will be unable to provide more 
precise estimates of relative treatment effects because a 
comparable control group would not be available. If the 
type of evidence required cannot be provided once a 
drug is approved, then price ought to be reduced so that 
its cost effectiveness is less uncertain. The health select 
committee recommended that price and the value of 
evidence ought to be linked.4  This would provide incen‑
tives for manufactures to invest in the type of evidence 
needed by the NHS early in the development of their 
products. Other things being equal, those who do invest, 
and reduce the uncertainty surrounding the cost effec‑
tiveness of their product at launch, would be rewarded 
with higher prices than those who do not. 9 18 
assessment vehicle
Robust assessments of cost effectiveness are critical, and 
there are detailed issues of methods, processes, and insti‑
tutional arrangements that need to be resolved. Much of 
the assessment needed to implement value based pric‑
ing is already being conducted by NICE.20 The existing 
process, however, would need to be strengthened to 
form a suitable vehicle for price negotiation.4 5 9 21 The 
appropriate institutional arrangements seem to follow 
naturally from the principles of value based pricing. 
These arrangements suggest that a suitable threshold, 
common to NICE and value based pricing, should be 
based on scientific analysis and be the responsibility of 
an independent authority, and that a single assessment 
and pricing authority should assess cost effectiveness, 
establish value based prices, and issue guidance to the 
NHS or that these functions should be closely linked. 
A pricing authority with political independence seems 
essential.
It is not so much price “negotiation” that is required 
but scientific deliberations between an assessment author‑
ity, the manufacturer, and other stakeholders concern‑
ing what the available evidence implies for estimates 
of cost effectiveness, price, and guidance. Any disputes 
will necessarily turn on explicit scientific questions that 
can ultimately be resolved through further investigation 
and a suitable appeal process. Decisions about price and 
guidance will inevitably be controversial, but responsibil‑
ity for rejecting or restricting access to a new technology 
will be more appropriately shared between an NHS that 
cannot afford wider use of an effective but cost ineffec‑
tive technology and a manufacturer unwilling to accept 
a price that would make it cost effective.
Conclusions
Scrapping the current pharmaceutical price regulation 
scheme provides important opportunities for the NHS. 
The principles of value based pricing are consistent 
with recent developments in NHS decision making and 
healthcare research.4 20 22 An appropriately implemented 
value based pricing scheme could offer significant ben‑
efits to the NHS in the short and longer term. There 
are, however, some dangers. A poorly specified pricing 
scheme could damage rather than improve the NHS 
and could undermine the evidence base for future NHS 
practice. The current pharmaceutical price regulation 
scheme is dead. The debate about what principles should 
guide its renegotiation, the meaning of value, and the 
relation between guidance, price, value, and evidence 
is, however, very much alive.
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Box 2 | Price, guidance, and volume
Figure 2 shows the relation between price and guidance, or 
the “NHS demand curve.”
Fig 2 | Price, guidance, and volume
Three subgroups of patients (S1, S2, S3) are represented; 
the drug is most cost effective for group S1 and least cost 
effective for S3. A menu of prices and associated guidance is 
available to the manufacturer:
• Choose a high price P3 but with restrictive guidance for use 
in S1 only, selling Q1 (revenue of P3×Q1)
• Choose P2 and get wider approval for S1 and S2, and sell 
Q2 (revenue of P2×Q2)
• Choose a low price (P1) and get unrestricted guidance for 
this indication (S1, S2, and S3) and sell Q3 (revenue of 
P1×Q3).
The NHS can gain net health benefits from technological 
innovation (before the entry of generics) only if the price is set at 
the level of the least cost effective subgroup. For example, at P2 
guidance restricts use to groups S1 and S2. The benefits of the 
technology for S2 just outweigh the health displaced elsewhere 
(there is no net health benefit from using the technology in this 
group). But for group S1 there is positive net benefit equivalent 
to area A in monetary terms (ICER is lower than the threshold). 
At the lower price of P1 there is unrestricted guidance, the NHS 
gets more benefit from technological innovation (area A, B, C) 
and in this case the manufacturer also gets more revenue by 
choosing this “lower price-wider coverage” option.
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Less than a year ago, when Nicolas Sarkozy was run‑
ning for president, health was not a priority. Indeed 
Le Monde, a leading French newspaper, carried 
the headline: “Health, the missing item in Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s reforms.”1 The reason for this omission may 
have been that the French health system is largely 
well perceived by citizens and users. However, the 
recent debate over the introduction of further non‑
reimbursable charges of €0.50 (£0.37; $0.75) for 
each drug packet and paramedical services such as 
physiotherapy, which came into effect at the begin‑
ning of this year, suggests that this satisfaction could 
become eroded.2 This article outlines the structure of 
France’s health system, analyses patients’ perceptions 
of it, and comments on the challenges it faces, not 
least with containing the high costs.
Overview of French health system
The French health system (box 1) is financed mainly by 
employers and employees through social contributions. 
It is characterised by ease of access to care, which could 
partly explain the high costs. General practitioners are 
self employed and get paid through a fee‑for‑service 
system. The number of healthcare professionals is fixed 
nationally by controlling admission to medical schools. 
This numerus clausus policy has been used to limit pri‑
mary care expenditure and, as a result, a temporary 
shortage of doctors is expected in the next few years. 
Competition in areas with high numbers of general 
practitioners can sometimes compel doctors to give 
way to patients’ demands to the detriment of overall 
provision of health care.
French citizens’ satisfaction 
According to a survey carried out in 2004, 65% of French 
citizens feel very positive about their health system and 
only 6% consider it a serious concern (table 1).4 5 This 
fairly high satisfaction rate confirms the conclusions of 
the World Health Organization’s 2000 report, which 
ranked France first among 191 countries on quality of 
health care.6 WHO studied five criteria: level and dis‑
tribution of health outcomes, level and distribution of 
responsiveness, and fairness of financing. Although the 
France�s health system gets high satisfaction ratings but is becoming harder to fund. Laurent Degos 
and colleagues examine the challenges of keeping citizens content and improving cost effectiveness 
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Countries across Europe have 
common health challenges but 
many different ways of tackling 
them. This article is the first in 
an occasional series that looks at 
what we can learn from each other.
Box 1|  French health system3
• Total health expenditure: 11.14% of gross domestic 
product in 2005
• Financing in 2003:
Public funds (national social insurance + health allocated 
taxes): 78%
Complementary voluntary health insurance: 14%
Out of pocket payment: 8%
• Regional planning:
26 regional agencies (Agences Régionale d’Hospitalisation)
Single data collection system (PMSI) used to report medical 
activity in public and private healthcare organisations
• Healthcare provision in 2005:
3.4 doctors/1000 inhabitants (48.9% general practitioners, 
51.1% specialists)
7.8 nurses/1000 inhabitants
1.1 pharmacists/1000 inhabitants
22 700 pharmacies
9.4 hospital beds/1000 inhabitants (2003 data)
71% public hospitals
11% private, not for profit hospitals
18% private, for profit hospitals
